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The Failure of Great Britain's "Southern
Expedition" of 1776: Revisiting Southern
Campaigns in the Early Y~ars of the American
Revolution, 1775-1779 by Roger Smith
he first five years of the American Revolution are traditionally
viewed as a New England-based conflict, fought principally
by a continuously-depleted Continental Army and Yankee
Minute Men; only after the siege of Charleston in 1780 did the
focus of the fighting shift south. 1 Historical documents pertaining
to Florida, however, reveal a far more complex story that exposes
the fallacy that tens of thousan~ds of able-bodied fighting men
from the southern colonies remained inactive while George
Washington 's Continental Army was out-manned, out-gunned, and
battered to pieces during the first five years of the war. The absence
of southern regiments and militia in northern campaignscampaigns desperately in want of more men and supplies- is
an indicator that southern troops were needed in the South. To
believe that the southern colonies were virtually ignored by the
British until the siege of Charleston would be to suggest that the
only reason General Sir Heriry Clinton, commander of the failed

T

Roger Smith is a research historian who focuses on the southern colonies and
British West Indies during the American Revolution.
1
Timelines constructed by sources that are highly regarded by the general public
support this premise: http: / /memory.loc.gov/ ammem/ gwhtml/ gwtimear.html
(accessed January 2008); http://www.nps.gov/ revwar/ about_the_revolution/
timeline_of_events_06_1 O.htinl; http:/ / www.pbs.org/ ktca/ liberty / chronicle_
timeline.html (accessedJanuary 2008).

[387]

Published by STARS, 2014

1

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 93 [2014], No. 3, Art. 7

388

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

British "Southern Expedition," sailed into <;:harleston Harbor with
an assault fleet in I 776 was because he was lost. 2
Colonial debates on rebellion and independence in the
southern colonies were very much a concern to King George III
and the ministers at Whitehall throughout the Revolutionary
period. The production of sugar, indigo, coffee, and cocoa in
the West Indies during this era was the driving economic force
underpinning the fiscal needs of empire. 3 The role played by the
North American colonies in the larger scheme of British imperial
priorities was that of a vast source of cheap provisions for the
British West Indies. 4 The political stability of the southern colonies
of North America was crucial to maintaining Britain's Atlantic
world trade. Yet the process for filling British imperial coffers faced
a devastating imbalance when Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia
fell in quick succession to the rebellion and the Continental
Congress imposed a trade embargo on Great Britain, Ireland,
and the British West Indies. 5 The dearth of southern food-stuffs
and essential supplies destined for British ports was exacerbated
by devastating hurricanes, drought, famine, and epidemic disease
throughout the Caribbean. 6 In the British West Indies, this deadly
2

3
4
5

6

For just a few examples of esteemed scholars who have advocated this school
of thought concerning the dearth of Revolutionary events in the southern
colonies prior to 1780, see Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The
American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982);
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon S . Wood, The American
Revolution: A History (New York: Random House, 2002); Edward Countryman,
The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985-Revised Edition
2003); John Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas,
1780-1782 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Simon Schama,
Rough Crossings: The Slaves, the British, and the American Revolution (New York:
HarperCollins Publishing, 2006).
Jan Rogoziiiski, A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib to the
Present (NewYork: Plume Group, 1999), 108.
Philip D . Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic
History,2"d ed. (Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press, 1998), 153.
Sherry Johnson, Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age
of Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011), 132-134, 136;
see also Richard B. Sheridan, "The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the British
West Indies during the American Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., 33, no.4 (October 1976): 615-641; Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, An
Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 143, 161-162.
For a full study of the ecological disasters and ensuing calamities brought to
the Caribbean region from the El Niiio/ La Niiia cycles of the Revolutionary
War era see Johnson, Climate and Catastrophe, 92-153; see also Sheridan "Crisis
of Slave Subsistence," 615-641; O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 143, 152.
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combination led to numerous slave revolts and the deaths of
thousands.7
With such calamity already in process it is inconceivable that
London had no plans from the earliest stages of the war to secure
southern interests, whether by strong-arm political maneuvers or
military force, for the sake of p_!'otecting supplies that would sustain
production in West Indian agriculture. That the southern colonies
only became of interest to Britain's war strategy after General John
Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga in tl.!_e fall of 1777 is perhaps the
greatest misconception of the American Revolution. Great Britain's
efforts to reclaim the southern colonies were in evidence as early
as September 12, 1775, and would continue throughout the war.8
If the South was not insignificant nor idle during the early
years of the war, neither was the colony of East Florida isolated
from southern Revolutionary events. 9 When viewed from a wider
Atlantic world perspective, the American Revolution was less
about thirteen colonies in rebellion than the preservation of an
empire consisting of thirty-three colonies in the British Americas,
stretching f rom Nova Scotia to Grenada. Revolutionary events
impacted the entirety of this region, and East Florida sat at the
geographic center of British interests in the Americas, wedged
squarely between the sugar-producing islands of the West Indies
and the rebellion. East Florida did not join the thirteen colonies
to the north, thereby providing the British military with a secure
fortified base for campaigns into the South. The colony also
7
8

9

Johnson, Climate and Catastrophe, 133; see also O'Shaughnessy, An Emp·ire
Divided, 145, 151, 161-162.
Edward J. Cashin, William Bartram and the American Revolution on the Southern
Frontier (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 189, 227 .
Britain 1.ost the southern colonies as follows: North Carolina: May 31, 1775.
North Carolina History Project. http: / / www.northcarolinahistory.org/
encyclopedia/ 812/ entry (accessed August 2012); Virginia: June 8, 1775 .
Encyclopedia Virginia. thttp: / / www.encyclopediavirginia.org/ Governors_of_
Virginia#start_entry (accessed August 2012); Georgia: June 9, 1775 (though
the royal governor was allowed to remain in the colony in a lame duck role
until January, 1776). Collections of the Georgia Historical Society (Vol. 1-21;
Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1840-2010), 3:183-185, 195, 218-220,
226-227; South Carolina: September 1775. Preservation Society of Charleston.
http: / / www.halseymap.com/ Flash/ governors.asp (accessed August 2012).
From the Chesapeake Bay south, only East and West Florida maintained fealty
to the Crown.
"On 4 November 1775, Congress authorized three battalions of Continental
troops for South Carolina and one battalion for Georgia ... recruiting would be
allowed in Virginia and North Carolina." Martha Condray Searcy, The GeorgiaFlorida Contest in the American Revolution, 1776-1778 (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 1985), 24.
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granted the British navy a haven from which to protect the trade
routes between the West Indies and Europe. East Florida's role in
shaping Revolutionary events provides valuable insight concerning
the whole of Britain's Atlantic world vision. This, in turn, opens
new discussions on the importance of the entire South, which, in
fact, was a hot bed of Revolutionary activity long before the siege
of Charleston in 1780.
As southern colonies fell one-by-one to the rebellion
throughout the summer and early ~all of 1775, loyalties to either
side in the war were often pledged eagerly. Yet for some, loyalty was
coerced- even demanded. On August 2, 1775, a large group of
Sons of Liberty from Augusta, Georgia, called on Thomas Brown
demanding that he sign an oath of loyalty to the independence
movement under threat of serious physical harm. Just twenty-five
years old, Brown was the son of a wealthy shipping magnate and
the great-grandson of Sir Isaac Newton. Brown made it well known
throughout Georgia and South Carolina that he was an aristocrat,
a magistrate, and a king's man. He stood his ground against the
threat and castigated those who would claim to stand for liberty
while demanding that he sacrifice his own freedom of choice in
the process. Approximately half of the men departed Brown's
residence, but the rest of the mob pressed onto the porch. The
fight was brief, as Brown shot one of the leaders before receiving
a rifle-butt blow from behind that fractured his skull. The mob
then led him to Augusta where he was stripped down to his boots,
severely beaten, and tied to a tree. 10
Various accounts establish that Brown was scalped at least
three times, perhaps four, and then tarred and feathered. His
legs were badly scalded as the tar collected in his boots, ultimately
costing him at least two of his toes; some reports say three. What
is unclear is whether Brown lost his toes directly as a result of the
boiling tar, or soon thereafter when his boots were pulled off and
hot brands and lighted sticks put to his feet. The Sons of Liberty
then tossed Brown into an open cart and paraded the injured
man from one end of Augusta to the other. The Georgia Gazette
mockingly described the torture as Brown "being presented with
a genteel and fashionable suit of tar and feathers," while the
Sons of Liberty would subsequently tag him with the nickname of
10

Cashin, William Bartram, 134; see a lso and Edward]. Cashin, The King's Ranger:
Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier (Athens :
University of Georgia Press, 1989), 27-29 .
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"Burnfoot Brown. " 11 Thomas Brown survived the ordeal, which, in
this particular case, served to strengthen his resolve to stand fast for
king and country.
Soon thereafter, on September 12, 1775, the commander of all
British troops in North America, General Thomas Gage, instructed
John Stuart, Superintendent of the Southern Indian District, to
employ the region's Native Atnericans to "take arms against His
Majesty's enemies and to distress them in all their power for no
terms is now to be kept with them. " 12 Such a measure for controlling
the North American frontier was -consistent with previous British
policies. Outrage ran high in the colonies as the great majority of
Native Americans in the southern backcountries supported Britain
in their fight against the land-hungry colonists. 13 That Whitehall
could not foresee the potential consequences of such a directive on
southern Loyalists as well as those in rebellion further reveals how
little they understood of life in the colonies, especially along the
frontier. Yet not all colonists protested. Thomas Brown, for one,
not only supported the decree, but was positioned both politically
and socially to use the situation to further his aims against the
rebellion. 14
During his recovery, Brown conferred by letter with deposed
governor William Campbell of Soqth Carolina, who recommended
a meeting with East Florida's governor Patrick Tonyn and
Superintendent John Stuart. 15 Upon his arrival in St. Augustine,
Brown assured Governor Tonyn that he had the names of four
thousand backcountry Loyalists from South Carolina and Georgia
who had pledged to form a force dedicated to the destruction of the
rebel movement and were willing to join with the aforementioned
11

12
13

14
15

For the collective account of the multiple reports concerning Thomas Brown's
assault see "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, November 23, 1776," PRO, CO
5/557, 20-21; Cashin, William Bartram, 134; Cashin, The King's Ranger, 27-29;
Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Conflict, 13; Charles B. Reynolds, Old St. Augustine: A
Story of Three Centuries (St. Augustine, FL: E.H. Reynolds, 1884), 92-93.
Cashin, William Bartram, 189, 227.
Hellen Hornbeck Tanner, "Pipesmoke and Muskets: Florida Indian Intrigues
of the Revolutionary Era," in Eighteenth-Century Florida and its Borderlands, ed.
Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 17-19, 2122, 24-25, 27.
'
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 35, 41-42.
Patrick Tonyn was governor ofEastFloridafromMarch 1, 1774, until the colony
was officially reclaimed by Spain onJuly 12, 1784. Before his appointment as
governor, Tonyn spent thirty-three years as an officer of dragoons in the British
Army. Roger C. Smith, "The Fourteenth Colony: Florida and the American
Revolution in the South" (Ph.D. diss. University of Florida, 2011), 51-54, 288.
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British-allied Native Americans. 16 Such an Anglo / Indian
collaboration would provide Stuart with the one facet of General
Gage's directive yet to be resolved: how to teach a large Indian
army to distinguish between Loyalists and rebels. Brown reckoned
that his frontiersmen would be more familiar with the ways of the
Indian allies, but he was not convinced that he could raise such an
army unless British regulars offered a demonstration of strength
along the Atlantic coast. Brown believed that with rebel attentions
focused on an amphibious assault by sea from the British army and
navy, the backcountry uprising could sweep down through Georgia
and the Carolinas, from the piedmont to the coast.
Brown needed a large supply of powder and other war
materiel, which he hoped to requisition from Superintendent
Stuart's storehouses in Pensacola. Brown would personally carry
these goods north from Pensacola through Creek lands in presentday southern Alabama, then lead the Native American allies to a
rendezvous with his backcountry Loyalists just west of Augusta. 17
In addition to his bitterness toward the people of Augusta, Brown
argued that the Indian trade business through Augusta was critical
to the colonies of Georgia and South Carolina. There, the Savannah
River and roads from the coast linked with several traditional
Indian trade routes that led to the heartlands of multiple southern
tribes. 18 Brown understood that to lose Augusta would "distress the
rebels beyond measure. " 19
To guarantee his success, Brown needed Stuart's agents to
focus on maintaining the recent peace that they brokered between
Creek headmen and other Native American leaders in the region.
This was a difficult task given that Stuart spent the previous decade
intentionally manipulating talks and negotiations between the British
and the southern Indian leadership in a manner that would keep the
Choctaws and Creeks at war with one another, so as to distract their
attention from encroaching settlers; there was even consideration of
16
17

18
19

Cashin, William Bartram, 215.
T h e C reek confederation was the most feared of southern Native American
tribes and nations during the Revolutionary era and, even though they were
a llie d to the British, gaining their cooperation in such efforts was not taken for
granted. "Talk with Indian Chiefs at Fort Bute by Charles Stuart, October 14,
1772," PRO, CO 5/ 74, f. 218. For more information on the Creek confederacy,
see Colin G. Callaway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and
D iversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University
P r ess, 1995), 215, 247.
Tanner, "Pipesmoke and Muskets," 15.
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 44.
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bringing the Cherokees into the war on the side of the Choctaws. 20
The Creek now demanded an iron-clad assurance from the British
that their towns and lands would be safe from Choctaws attack once
their men waged a new war against the rebels to the east. 21 Most
important to Brown, Native American warriors and backcountry
frontiersmen had to put aside the ingrained distrust that brewed
over the past century from Angfo-settler encroachment on Indian
lands. Regardless of the potential drawbacks, John Stuart favored
Brown's plan; Patrick Tonyn was elated. 22
By November 1775, with the capitals of the colonies of Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia under rebel control,
Governor Tonyn, Superintendent Stuart, and Governor Peter
Chester of West Florida were anxious to quash the rebellion coursing
southward toward St. Augustine and Pensacola. 23 While Brown waited
for word from London concerning his proposal, Tonyn oversaw the
efforts to improve East Florida's defenses. 24 Tonyn's first priority
was to safeguard St. Augustine, at the time the only loyal Atlantic
coast capital between Boston and Kingston,Jarnaica. 25 St. Augustine
was home t6 a large, seventeenth-century, Spanish-built, masonry
fortress. A smaller masonry fort was located fourteen miles south
of St. Augustine at the Matanzas Inlet. As Washington would soon
learn, Britain was in the process orstoring large quantities of muchneeded arms and munitions in the primary fortress in St. Augustine,
presumably for an incursion into Georgia. 26

20
21
22

23
24

25

26

"Report of Governor George Johnstone to the Board of Trade, May 19, 1766,"
PRO, CO 5 / 67, f. 45.
"Letter from John Stuart to Lord George Germain, January 1, 1779," PRO, CO
5/ 80, f. 155.
Cashin, William Bartram, 215. Patrick Tonyn saw Brown's plan as his opportunity
to return to the battlefield. Tonyn, an aging veteran, feared that his last
opportunity for a battlefield commission was fading .
Cashin, William Bartram, 209.
"Patrick Tonyn to Lord Dartmouth,July, 1, 1774," PRO, CO 5/554, 31; see also
Albert Manucy andAlberta Johnson, "Castle St. Mark and the Patriots of the
Revolution," Florida Historical Quarterly, 21, no. 1Quly1942) : 8.
Boston would remain under British control until March 1776, while New York
City was still in the hands of the rebel forces until the following September.
Joseph J. Ellis, Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 4, 148.
This is the first mention of St. Augustine by Washington in his papers, both
as a military concern and a military target. The George Washington Papers
(hereafter GWP), "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge,
December 18, 1775."
http: / /memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw040168)) (accessed February 2006).
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General Sir William Howe replaced Gage in October 1775.
By this point, former North Carolina governor Josiah Martin had
guaranteed to raise Clinton an army of ten thousand Loyalists
eager to support an invasion of the southern colonies. 27 Hearing
of such a large army of faithful subjects, military strategists up to
the highest level of the British court were encouraged that this
venture would be successful. In a letter dated December 6, 1 775fully six months prior to the Declaration of Independence and
contemporary with Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill- Lord George
Germain, who replaced Lord Dartmouth as Secretary of State of
the American Colonies on November 10, 1775, informed Clinton
he was to "Command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies."
Germain references a letter dated October 22, 1775, stating that
King George III had officially called for the invasion of the southern
colonies, dubbing it the "Southern Expedition," for the purpose
of "reducing to Obedience the Southern Provinces of North
America, now in Rebellion." 28 By this point, Clinton had been
made aware of Brown's proposed backcountry strike at Augusta,
fully understanding how its success would provide support to his
own incursion into the southern colonies. 29
The directive from Germain not only invoked the authority
and wishes of King George III, but provided significant detail to
the plan, including George Ill's desire that the "15t11 , 37m, 53rct,
54m, and 57t11 Regiments of Infantry, together with two Companies
of Artillery, should embark at Corke [Ireland] about the 1st of
December [1775] ." 30 This was not an inquiry to gather opinions
from the empire's military leadership, but an order from the king
to put the process in motion for the invasion of the South. The
directive refutes the idea that the British had little interest in
the southern colonies until the siege of Charleston in 1780. The
question is, what happened to the Southern Expedition?

27
28

29
30

"Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/ 55/ 1,
doc. 68, 4 .
"Lord George Germain, November 10, 1775," PRO 30/55/ l, doc. 83, l. The
date that King George officially signed this decree was October 16, 1775. "Lord
Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer appointed to command an
Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5 / 92, f.
375, 759 .
Cashin, King's Ranger, 32, 41.
"Lord Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer app9inted to
command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO,
co 5/92, f. 375, 759.
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Clinton's objective was to strike out from New York with Admiral
Sir Peter Parker and "a squadron of warships (two 50-gun twodecker 'fourth rates,' four 28-gun frigates and a half dozen other
vessels of substantial potency) plus transports ... fifty sail in all." 31
Clinton was to rendezvous at the mouth of the Cape Fear River
with Martin's ten thousand North Carolina Loyalists. There they
would be joined by the fleet from Ireland, under the command of
the Earl, Charles Lord Cornwallis. 32 This fleet carried ten thousand
stands of arms destined for Loyalist militias. 33 Cornwallis's landing
forces would eventually swell to -seven full regiments of British
regulars and the aforementioned companies of artillery; 2,500
redcoats in all. 34 A coastal attack by Clinton and Cornwallis and a
pincer attack from the west provided by Brown seemed like sound
strategies to the Lords at Whitehall and George III. Both attack
plans employed conventional military tactics of the era, which held
that coinciding land and sea assaults on coastal enemy strongholds
were key to victory. The Royal Navy and the British Army were
without equal in the discipline required to execute this type of
amphibious operation. 35
31

32

33

34

35

The warships ships listed in this letter were the "Bristol, Acteon, Solebay, Syren,
Sphinx, and D eal Castle, the Hawk Sl9 op, and Thunder Bomb." "Lord George
Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/ 592, f. 375-82,
759-84; see also John W. Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution:
A Battlefield History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 37.
For a detailed account of the battle at Fort Sullivan (first British assault on
Charleston Harbor) see Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 3646; see also "May 31 ," in William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, So
Far as it Related to The States of North and South Carolina, and Georgia, (Vol. 1 and
2; New York: Printed by David Longworth, for the Author, 1802; reprint Arno
Press, 1968), 1:140.
Cornwallis was a late addition to this expedition at the request of King George
III. When the decision was made to include Lord Cornwallis, his 33rct Regiment
of Foot was substituted for whichever of the aforementioned regiments General
Clinton so chose. "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6,
1775," PRO, CO 5/ 92, f. 382, 784.
"Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO
30/55/ 1, doc. 83, l; see also Ira D. Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," in
The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership; Essays in Honor
of john Richard Alden, ed. Robert W. Higgins (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1979), 210.
In this correspondence, Lord Germain specified that the seven regiments
involved were the 15'11 , 37 1.h, 53rct, 54'\ and 57th Regiments of Foot, with the king
dictating the addition of the 20'11 and 46u' Regiments of Foot after t11ey were
blown off course by a storm on their way to Quebec. "Lord George Germain
to Sir William Howe, November 8, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 80, 1-8; "Lord
George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 37582, 759-784; see also Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 37.
Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 37.
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Lord Germain was ardent in his preference for Savannah as the
primary target of the Southern Expedition, though he was careful
not to defy George Ill's wishes that General Clinton, who knew the
colonies better than anyone at Whitehall, would determine where
the initial strike should occur. 36 Germain repeatedly expressed that
Charleston, Lord Dartmouth's preference, was only to be considered
if it was deemed an easy victory. 37 If not, Germain insisted, there
was no other option more preferred than Savannah-going so far
as to pin-point the landing site for the army at Cockspur Inlet at
the mouth of the Savannah River. 38 Germain was also well aware
of Brown's plan for a counter-rebellion in the west and its value to
Clinton's invasion. Germain's preference for Savannah was logical
because Lieutenant Colonel Augustine A. Prevost, commander of
British forces in East Florida, could support the invasion by bringing
troops up from St. Augustine to place the targeted invasion site in a
vice. Savannah was the nearest port city under consideration within
sensible striking distance from St. Augustine. 39 In an earlier letter to
General William Howe, even Lord Dartmouth described Savannah
as a desirable target and the expedition as "a measure of so much
importance, every Circumstance, that can give facility of Security to
the landing of the Forces from Ireland, will deserve attention. " 40
Germain enjoyed political good fortune by inheriting a
campaign that was considered crucial to a quick and decisive
resolution to the rebellion in the southern colonies. Economically,
Charleston was the richest of the southern port cities under rebel
36

37

38
39

40

"Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO
30/55/1, doc. 68, 4. On November 7, 1775, Lord Dartmouth issued a curious
countermand to King George Ill's wishes that General Clinton select the
invasion sight of his choosing. In a letter to Governor Josiah Martin, Dartmouth
directed Clinton to strike at Charleston. Three days later, Lord George
Germain wrote that Lord Dartmouth had resigned and Germain had been
appointed to replace him. "Lord Dartmouth to Governor Martin, November
7, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc . 82, 1-4; "Lord George Germain, November 10,
1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 83, 1.
"Lord Dartmouth to Governor Martin, November 7, 1775," PRO 30/55/1,
doc. 82, 1-4; see also "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6,
1775,"' PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375- 382, 759- 784.
"Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1 775," PRO, CO 5/92,
f. 375-382, 759-784.
Upon Lt. Colonel Prevost's arrival in St. Augustine on April 4, 1776, Governor
Tonyn's hopes of leading his colony's troops into battle were quashed
c·ompletely, along with any pretense of cooperation between Tonyn and Lt.
Colonel Prevost. "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, April 11, 1776," PRO, CO
5/556, 152-154.
"Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/55/1,

doc. 83, 4-5.
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control, but a British defeat would have potentially devastating
political ramifications for Germain. Germain structured his
orders to Clinton with just enough nuance to secure his own
political footing, while leaving Clinton in a position to face the
consequences in the event of failure. Clinton was likely aware of
Germain's political gamesmanship, but he also understood that
a sweeping victory at Charleston would add to his social status in
London far more than taking the smaller target of Savannah. The
choice was his to make, regardless of Germain's prodding. 4 1
By January 1776, Britain's southern strategy included an
invasion fleet bearing Cornwallis en route from Corke to the Cape
Fear River in North Carolina for a mid-to-late February rendezvous
with a force of ten thousand Loyalists. 42 Clinton would provisio.n a
second fleet in New York to strike out for Cape Fear, while Brown
collected twenty pack-horse loads of powder in Pensacola for
Indian allies. 43 British planners also set aside funds to provision
1,500 British regulars in St. Augustine under Lt. Colonel Prevost,
which were roughly 1, 100 more troops than St. Augustine typically
garrisoned up to that time. 44
The planners of the British war effort were not the only
military strategists interested in East Florida. As early as December
1775, Washington focused on tb.ree large-scale offensives that
would span the length of the colonies. The commander-in-chief
was personally directing the siege of Boston while General Richard
Montgomery was in Canada demanding the surrender of Quebec.
On December 17, 1775, in the midst of these two campaigns,
Washington was handed a packet of captured letters written by
the deposed royal governor of Virginia, John Murray, 4r11 Earl of
Dunmore. Lord Dunmore 's correspondence was addressed to
various royal governors in the Americas, including Patrick Tonyn.45
41
42
43

44
45

"Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/ 92,
f. 375-382, 764.
Ibid., f. 382, 784.
"Lord Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer appointed to
command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO,
CO 5/ 92, f. 375, 759-761; see also Cashin, King's Ranger, 42.
'John Robinson to John Pownall, Treasury Chamber, March 28, 1776," PRO,
30/ 55/ 2,doc. 148, 1-2.
Lord Dunmore was the last royal governor in Virginia. In what became known
as Dunmore's Proclamation, he offered freedom to slaves who would take up
arms against the rebellion. Dunmore believed that the threat of arming slaves
would cause a panic that would subvert the revolt. Douglas R. Egerton, Death or
Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 6, 66, 68-73.
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It was from these intercepted letters that Washington learned
that the British were stockpiling a large cache of munitions in St.
Augustine's masonry fortress. As strained as he was with current
endeavors, Washington wasted no time drafting a letter to Congress
concerning St. Augustine. Washington beseeched the delegates to
authorize an immediate, full-scale attack, relaying information that
"Governor Tonyn 's and many other letters from Augustine shew the
Weakness of the place, at the same time of what vast consequence It
would be for us to possess ourselves of it, and the great quantity of
Amm.unition contained in the forts." 46
On January 1, 1776, a committee in Congress responded
to Washington's request to seize the barracks and "castle" of St.
Augustine. 47 In addition to the state militias of Georgia, South
Carolina, and North Carolina requested by Washington, Congress
also sent regiments of the regular Continental Army from Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina. Originally, Major General
Charles Lee, second in command only to Washington, and the
newly-appointed commander of the Southern Department of the
Continental Army, was slated to lead the attack on St. Augustine with
Major General Robert Howe as second in command. In all, there
were 1,500 Continental regulars and 500-1,000 militia amassed to
invade East Florida. 48 Lee, however, went to Charleston to assist in
46

47

48

This letter was read in Congress (December 30, 1775) and referred to Thomas
Lynch, William Hooper, George Wythe, Silas Deane, and John Adams.
http:/ / memory.loc.gov/ cgi-bin / query/ r?ammem/ mgw:@field(DOCID+@
lit(gw040168)) (accessed February 2006)
GWP, "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18,
1775," http:/ /memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3a/001/098097.gif (accessed
February 2006)
Searcy, The Florida-Geargia Contest, 54; see also Cashin, The King's Ranger, 53.
From the beginning of the American Revolution till the present day, the United
States has employed the policy that it is the civilian branches of the government,
specifically the president and Congress, who set the policies that the nation's
armed forces enact on the ground in times of war. Many times this policy
has been publically contested, such as with President Truman and General
McArthur, or President Lincoln and General McClellan. It was Congress that
ordered Washington to release six regiments of Continental regulars to invade
Canada while he was in the midst of besieging Boston. This is why Washington's
letter to Congress on December 18, 1775 is in the nature of a request to invade
East Florida rather than a decree of military purpose. Congress then voted
on the measure on January 1, 1776. This vote directed Washington to send
regiments of the Continental Army in addition to the southern state militias
that Washington initially requested. Ellis, Revolutionary Summer, 43; see also,
GWP, "George Washington to Contirrental Congress, Cambridge, December 18,
1775," http:/ /memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3a/001/098097.gif (accessed
February 2006)
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the city's defense against the oncoming siege by Clinton. As the
British heightened military activity in St. Augustine, Howe's army
of Continental regulars and state militia was marching through the
southern colonies toward East Florida. Congress was so confident
in the outcome of Lee's mission that South Carolina delegate John
Rutledge was sent to East Florida to inspect what he presumed would
be the newly acquired provincial capital at St. Augustine and its
fortresses. 49
Nothing went according to plan. The efforts of both the rebel
army and Britain's Southern Expedition were so poorly executed
that neither would maintain any resemblance to the plans
envisioned by Washington and George III.
For Great Britain, the first calamity involved Governor
Josiah Martin 's ostensible army of ten thousand loyal North
Carolinians. In reality, the army numbered approximately 1,500
men who were poorly armed and unprepared for battle. On
February 27 , this ill-equipped militia was intercepted at Moore's
Creek Bridge by one thousand well-armed North Carolina rebels
bent on independence. The battle was short-lived with thirty
or more Loyalists killed or wounded and virtually the entire
remaining Loyalist militia captured. 50 When Clinton arrived at
the Cape Fear River rendezvous on March 13, two weeks behind
schedule, he learned that his ten thousand-man Loyalist army
was not coming.
More bad news arrived at Clinton's camp at Cape Fear on
March 15, when Stuart sailed in from St. Augustine to advise the
general that he had reconsidered the wisdom of allowing Brown
to march their Indian allies, especially the Creeks, as far east as
Savannah. He claimed that having so many Creek warriors fight
on the coast would leave their villages unprotected from Choctaws
attack. 51 Clinton could do little but protest Stuart's interference in
the operation. Tonyn viewed Stuart's actions as nothing more than
49

50

51

GWP, "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18,
1775." http: / / memory.loc.gov/ mss/ mgw/ mgw3a/ 001 / 098097.gif (accessed
February 2006).
According to historian Hugh F. Rankin, "It was impossible to determine the
casualties suffered by the loyalists . There were at least thirty, but it was assumed
that a number had fallen into the creek and drowned, or h.a d died of their
wounds in the swamps after fleeing from the field of action ." Based on a letter
from "Caswell to Hartnet, February 27, 1776," C .R.X., 482, in Hugh F. Rankin,
"Moore 's Creek Bridge Campaign, 1776," North Carolina Historical Review, 30,
nos. 1-4 (January-October 1953): 52.
Cashin, William Bartram, 215.
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an attempt to reposition himself as the sole arbiter of southern
Native American matters.52 Stuart's feelings toward Brown were not
personal, but rather were ascribed by Brown as guilt-by-association
since Stuart and Tonyn despised each other and Tonyn held Brown
in such high esteem. 53 But Stuart's actions were motivated by more
than just his feelings for Brown. Stuart was the Superintendent of
the Southern Indian Department, not Brown. If anyone received
praise from London for leading these Native American allies in to
battle, it would be Stuart. 54 He went to great lengths to guarantee
the failure of Brown 's attempt to raise his backcountry army, a move
that would serve to confuse American veterans even after the war.
In his Memoirs, rebel general William Moultrie , who commanded
the fort on Sullivan's Island in the defense of Charleston in 1 776
and many other southern campaigns, recalled that if the British
had brought their Indian allies down upon the backcountries one
month before Clinton attacked the coast, it would have forced
thousands of rebel soldiers to remain behind to protect their
families .55 Stuart wanted to show that he alone controlled the
Southern Indian Department. 56
As a result, Brown roamed the Indian lands of West Florida
and Georgia in search of a legion of Creek warriors that was never
to form. 57 He arrived in the Lower Creek town of Chiaha along
the Flint River in southern Georgia with his cargo of gunpowder,
where he awaited Stuart's agent to assist with distribution. 58 It was at
Chiaha that Brown received word to turn back; there would be no
Native American alliance arranged through Stuart's office. 59 Brown,
now bitter, remained in the backcountry until September, hoping
to revive his plan, which coincided with Clinton's understanding
that the plan was not canceled, just postponed until Lord Germain
could be consulted. 60 Stuart, on the other hand, went so far as to
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60

"Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton, May 8, 1776," PRO , CO 5 / 556, 172.
O'Donnell, "The Florida Revolutionary Indian Frontier," 62-63; see also,
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 55.
"Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton, May 8 , 1776," PRO, CO 5 / 556, 172.
Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:185.
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 45 .
Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 28.
John E. Worth, "The Eastern Creek Frontier: History and Archaeology of the
Flint River Towns, ca. 1750- 1826." Paper presented in the symposium "Recent
Advances in Lower Creek Archaeology" at the annual conference of the
Society for American Archaeology, Nashville, TN. , April 4, 1997. http: / / uwf.
edu/ jworth/WorthSAA1997. pdf (accessed February 2014)
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 48.
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 45. On May 5, 17 76, Brown stated that he could raise
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invite Creek and Cherokee headmen to a congress in Pensacola to
ensure Brown's failure to recruit an Indian army. 61 Upon Brown's
eventual return to St. Augustine, Tonyn compensated him with a
commission of lieutenant colonel of militia and command of the
East Florida Rangers. 62
On May 3, 1 776, Cornwallis and the invasion fleet from Ireland
straggled into the Cape Fear River. The ships had been scattered
after receiving the brunt force of a hurricane while crossing the
Atlantic and had regrouped injamaica before proceeding to Cape
Fear. 63 With Brown's Anglo/Indian-alliance doomed before he ever
arrived in Creek lands, Clinton no longer saw Savannah as a target.
On the other hand, Peter Parker, commander of the fleet, argued
against Charleston as a viable option, believing that it would be
more heavily guarded than Savannah and there was no hope of
ground support from St. Augustine. Parker was eventually coerced
by Clinton to sail his fleet to Charleston and engage in what would
become a defeat so humiliating that the two men spent much of
their remaining careers-both among their peers in the military,
as well as on the floor of Parliament-blaming the failure of the
ill-conceived attack on the other. 64 The Southern Expedition was
in shambles, but Washington's urgent call to capture East Florida
fared no better.
The Continental Congress would learn that something
was amiss with their plans to invade East Florida shortly after
John Rutledge arrived in Charleston. Rutledge wrote back to
Philadelphia on February 13, 1776, stating that St. Augustine was
not still taken because the rebel army had yet to attack. 65 In spite

61
62

63
64
65

2,000-3,000 Loyalists in just one month's time. "Letter from Thomas Brown
Concerning Indian Issues, May 5, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, f. 172-180.
Cashin, The King's R.anger, 54-55.
PRO, CO 5/ 556, 173-180, in the "Lawson Files" at the P.K. Yonge Library of
Florida History and Special Collections at the University of Florida. The East
Florida Rangers were a military unit drawn from former Georgia and South
Carolina backwoodsmen and small planters. Many of these refugees from
revolutionary upheaval in their home colonies were hand-picked by Governor
Tonyn and saw them as his personal army, over which he claimed "absolute
authority." "Patrick Tonyn to Augustine Prevost,July 5, 1777," PRO, CO 5/557,
148-49; see also Callaway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, 259;
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 59, 61-62, 64-65, 74, 78-79, 89-90.
Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 213. Note: the use of the term "squadron"
is an acceptable reference since there was no ship-of-the-line involved in this
convoy.
Frances Reece Kepner, "A British View of the Siege of Charleston, 1776,"
journal of Southern History 11, no. 1 (February 1945), 94.
"Martin Jollie to Patrick Tonyn, February 13, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 81. In
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Map of Southern Expedition (1776). Source: Dixon Ryan Fox, Harper's Atlas of
American History (1920), modifications by the author. Courtesy of Historic Print &
Map Company, St. Augustine, Florida.
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of this set-back, by the summer of 1776 the Continental Army was
much better organized in the southern theater than their British
counterparts, yet their efforts also came to nothing. Lee was in
Charleston to take command of the city's defense against the
oncoming siege, while Robert Howe and his rebel troops marched
to Savannah where they held a defensive position until August
19, presumably on the off-chanee-- that Clinton and Parker turned
their strike force south. 66 Despite Washington's urgent call for the
immediate invasion of East Florida nine months earlier, a British
invasion fleet poised to besiege Charleston took precedence.
Lee was a narcissistic braggart who believed himself more
valuable to the Revolution than anyone, including Washington. His
arrival in Charleston in June to assume command from General
Moultrie was timed in such a manner that he would reap as much
glory as possible if victorious, while risking little if the rebel army was
defeated. 67 Lee then spent the month ofJuly leading and directing
raids against Cherokee villages in Virginia and the Carolinas before
finally joining Robert Howe's assault force in Savannah that was
bound for St. Augustine. Lee, as the superior-ranking officer and
true to his flair for the grandiose, took command of the army and
led it out of Savannah toward East Florida, unaware that a courier
with a letter dated August 8, 1776,-Garried orders for Lee to return
north and rejoin Washington on Long Island. With Lee recalled,
Howe took full command of the rebel army and continued the
march southward. 68
Meanwhile in East Florida, British regulars gathered on the
banks of the St. Marys River as early as May 29, awaiting orders to
join the Southern Expedition. Cornwallis's late arrival at the Cape
Fear River had thrown the British invasion hopelessly off schedule,
however. 69 After a month of border skirmishes, various companies
of Georgia rebel militia had built up strong defenses along the
northern banks of the St. Marys River. By late July, fighting escalated
to such a pitch that the Georgia militia could breach East Florida's
defenses and push the British army back to the southern banks of the

66
67
68
69

all fairness, it would be another two weeks, February 27, 1776, before the
"Continental Congress created a Southern Military Department, consisting of
Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia." Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 24.
Cashin, The King's Ranger, 53.
·
Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 38-39. See also, Cashin, The
King's Ranger, 51-53.
Cashin, King's Ranger, 53.
Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 44.
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St.Johns River. 70 As Howe's Continentals reached Sunbury, Georgia,
an outbreak of multiple fevers struck the rebel camp. By the time
Howe reached the banks of the St. Marys River just three days later,
disease had ravaged his ranks and the army was too sick to cross the
river into East Florida. 71 Howe's army was too weak to reinforce the
Georgians and press the campaign further into East Florida. At the
same time, the Georgia militia holding the ground between the St.
Johns and St. Marys rivers found a new threat against which they had
no defense: rumors of Cherokee raids in the Georgia backcountry.
To protect their families and possessions, the Georgians abandoned
the campaign against East Florida to return to their homes. In a
letter dated June 8, 1 776, Tonyn noted that " [ t] he Americans [were]
a thousand times more in dread of the Savages than of any European
troops." 72 Frustrated by the campaign's failure, Washington recalled
Robert Howe and the army.
The backcountry raids that struck such fear among the Georgia
militia were engineered by Stuart, who had begun his own Indian
war against the rebels. Discouraging the Indians from allying with
Brown or anyone else sent by Whitehall, Stuart encouraged the
Cherokees to form an alternative alliance. 73 The Cherokees achieved
early successes during the months of June and July 1776, raiding
from Virginia through the Carolinas and into Georgia. 74 By August,
rebel militias counterattacked unprotected Cherokee villages and
towns, the very concern that Stuart had raised when discussing the
flaws of Brown's plan at the Cape Fear River discussed with Clinton
in March. Stuart's plan also put innocent Cherokees in harm's
way, verifying Tonyn's assertion that Stuart's only true concern
was in keeping others from diminishing his control over southern
Indian affairs. 75 As mentioned previously, after Lee assisted with
the defense of Charleston, he joined Virginia militiamen in strikes
on Cherokee villages of the mountain regions, while Carolinians
70
71
72
73
74
75

Ibid., 50.
Searcy, The Georgi-a-Florida Contest, 61.
"Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton,June 8, 1776," PRO, CO 5 / 556, 177180; see also, Higgins, The Revolutionary War in the South, 255.
Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 46.
James K. Swisher, The Revolutionary War in the Southern Backcountry (New York:
Pelican Publication Company, 2008), 66-67.
John Stuart's concern for Thomas Brown's impact on the control of southern
Native American affairs may not have been without grounds. When Stuart died
in 1779, Brown was named his successor. Wilbur H. Siebert, ed., Loyalists in East
Florida: The Narrative (Deland, FL: Publications of the Florida State Historical
Society, No. 9, vol. I and II, 1929), 1:24, 76.
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crushed the lower Cherokee towns. South Carolina statesman
William Henry Drayton later bragged of his role in the destruction
of Cherokee settlements. 76 The onslaught devastated the Cherokee
nation so thoroughly that by 1 777, tribal leaders signed over all
remaining lands in South Carolina to rebel leadership. 77 Only the
young warriors continued the fight against the European onslaught
by moving south into Creek andBeminole lands. 78
As the southern war continued, Washington renewed his quest
to secure the fortress at St. Augustine. On May 6, 1777, a second
rebel invasion of East Florida began. It was short-lived, thoroughly
quashed in just three days, as the rebel army of approximately
1,200 Continental regulars from Virginia and Georgia, as well as
Georgia militia, was soundly defeated by the recently-promoted
General Prevost's British regulars, the East Florida militia, and
Brown's East Florida Rangers. 79 Dogged determination kept St.
Augustine safe during this invasion, as the inhabitants volunteered
almost to a man to defend the city. At one critical point General
Prevost recommended a scorched-earth policy to keep the outlying
plantations from providing food and shelter to the invading rebel
army. One of the threatened plantations was that of Tonyn, who
never questioned what must be done. The governor ordered the
complete destruction of his 20,000_acre plantation, which included
two large frame houses, more than two dozen outlying buildings,
quarters, and mills, and all the produce and timber on the property. 80
As fate would have it, British efforts turned back the invading army
before it reached Tonyn's plantation. Thomas Brown intercepted
Colonel John Baker's Georgia dragoons, driving them into the
waiting sights of Major Mark Prevost, General Prevost's younger
76

77
78

79
80

"William Henry Drayton to Francis Salvador, July 24, 1776," Robert Wilson
Gibbes, Documentary history of the American revolution: Consisting of ktters and
papers relating to the contest for liberty, chiefly in South Carolina, from originals in the
possession of the editor, and other sources (New York: D. Appleton & Co.; Columbia,
S.C.: Banner Steam Power Press, 1853-1857), 1:183-184, 196-198.
Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution, 53.
"Dragging Canoe became the leader of the Chickamauga Cherokees, a strongly
anti-American faction of the Cherokee Nation. The Chickamauga would
ultimately secede from the Cherokee Nation and withdraw south along the
Tennessee River to an area more accessible to British agents coming through
the Creek country from Pensacola and St. Augustine." O'Donnell, "The South
on the Eve of the Revolution," 72.
Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 88-90.
Daniel L. Schafer, "Florida History On-Line," with special acknowledgment to
the James Grant Papers and the Florida Claims Commission. http: / /www.unf.
edu/ floridahistoryonline/ / Plantations/ plantations/ Colonel_Patrick_Tonyn .
htm (accessed March 2006).
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brother, and his British regulars. The main body of the Continental
Army under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elbert e ntrapped itself on
Amelia Island and contributed little more than property damage
to the invasion. 8 1
Yet the successful repulsion of the rebel invasion does not show
that every East Floridian had the same determination to obstruct
the rebel invasion at any cost. When news reached St. Augustine
that rebels had breached the East Florida border, merchants
Spencer Mann and James Penman, along with Lieutenant Colonel
Robert Bissett, the engineer who built the King's Road from
the Georgia border to New Smyrna plantation, came to Tonyn
demanding that the colony be surrendered to the invading forces. 82
These three men even proposed to bribe the rebels to leave their
plantations unmolested. Penman declared that if Tonyn denied
their request, he would disregard the governor completely and
meet the oncoming army alone with a flag of truce to make his own
arrangements. 83 This was not the sort of demand one should make
to an individual who had just destroyed his own valuable property
for the sole purpose of frustrating the invading army. In a letter to
Germain, Tonyn accused the three of cowardice in the face of the
enemy. Bissett, as an officer in the British army, was particularly
targeted in Tonyn's letter as unfit for duty. 84
In the rebel camp, the 1777 invasion of East Florida was
doomed from the start because of the conflict between two political
adversaries: Button Gwinnett, Georgia's militia leader and a signer
of the Declaration of Independence, and Brigadier General
Lachlan Mcintosh of the Continental Army. Each man presumed
superiority over the other and their in-fighting became so inflamed
that the Georgia assembly recalled them to Savannah to explain
their actions. Mcintosh insulted his rival in front of the Georgia
Assembly and Gwinnett challenged Mcintosh to a duel. Both men

81

82

83
84

Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Volume V, Part 2, Order Book of Samuel
Elbert, Colonel and Brigadier General in the Continental Army, 1776-1778, Published
by Wymberley Jones D eRenne as a Contribution to Georgia History (Savannah, GA:
The Morning News Print, 1902), 26. http: / / books.google .com/ books?id=dLs
6AQAAMAAJ &printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February
2014).
William S. Lowe, "An Aerial Search for the Old King's Road," November 6,
2006
http: / I academic.emporia.edu/ aberjame / student/ lowe2 / old_king_
road.htm. (accessed April 2014) .
Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 107.
"Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, May 8, 1777," PRO, CO 5 / 557, 104.
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received wounds and Gwinnett died days later. 85 This left the rebel
army without strong leadership on the eve of the invasion.
The 1777 rebel invasion of East Florida was so inept that the
most significant impact of the invasion was Tonyn's destruction of
his own property. This inva~ion exposed even further the lack of
strong leadership in the Southern Continental Army, which needed
a man who could maintain the res pect of those in command of state
militias. In April 1 778, Washington called for a third invasion of
East Florida, once again sending a combined army of Continental
regulars under the command of Robert Howe, along with Georgia
militia led by their governor John Houstoun, nearly two thousand
troops in all. 86 Howe and Houstoun, like others before them, would
soon discover that the East Florida terrain was as much the enemy
as British regulars and East Florida Rangers. 87
At the same time, Germain was planning a second campaign
against the southern colonies, which he hoped to have in place
as early as January 1778. British supreme commander Sir William
Howe, however, ignored Germain's orders, allowing Washington
to strike first. Robert Howe's rebels began their assault on East
Florida on June 28, 1778. Again, in-fighting between Continental
and militia leadership predestined the effort to failure . Houstoun
believed that the best approach was to hit St. Augustine directly,
avoiding Brown and a small company of East Florida Rangers at
Fort Tonyn just across the St. Marys River. Howe insisted that they
remove the threat at Fort Tonyn first, and then proceed to St.
Augustine. The debate became so heated that Houstoun refused
to cross the river at all, leaving Howe to attack Fort Tonyn on his
own. Brown saw an advance party of approximately one hundred
mounted rebel dragoons cross the St. Marys River, so he set fire
to the fort and escaped through the swamps to the south. The
rebel dragoons gave chase as Howe brought the main body of the
Continental Army across the St. Marys River and set up camp at the
smoldering ruins of Fort Tonyn. Brown led the charging rebels on
85
86
87

Georgiainfo: An Online Georgia Almanac. http: / / georgiainfo.galileo.usg.
edu/ topics/ people/ article/ military-leaders/ lachlan-mcintosh (accessed April
2014).
W. Calvin Smith, "Mennaids Riding Alligators: Divided Command on the
Southern Frontier, 1776-1778," Florida Historical Quarterly, 54; no. 4 (April
1976),443-464,459.
"Letter from Col. Pinckney, Sunberry, July 23rd, 1778," in William Moultrie,
Memoirs of the American Revolution, so far as it related to the States ofNorth and South
Carolina, and Georgia (Vol. 1 and 2; New York: Printed by David Longworth, for
the Author, 1802; reprinted New York: Arno Press, Inc ., 1968), 1:238.

Published by STARS, 2014

21

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 93 [2014], No. 3, Art. 7

408

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

a seventeen mile hunt before they realized that Brown had steered
them into an ambush at Alligator Creek Bridge. Mark Prevost's
regulars and the remainder of the East Florida Rangers routed the
exhausted rebels, though some managed to escape to rejoin the
main army. By then, Howe's men were out of food and ravaged
with camp fevers. Houstoun finally crossed into East Florida on
July 6, and immediately began arguing with Howe over leadership.
Half-starved and demoralized, the rebels re-crossed the St. Marys
River into Georgia on July 14, ending the third attempt to take East
Florida in as many years. 88
Other studies support contemporary beliefs concerning the
importance of capturing St. Augustine in order for Georgia and
South Carolina ever to know peace. These works argue that the
failure of the invasion of East Florida in the summer of 1 778 set
the stage for the British invasion of Georgia in December of that
same year. 89 Yet while Germain was keen to initiate another thrust
into the southern colonies, his generals were wary. William Howe
refused to answer the call for a southern strike in January 1778,
and Clinton delayed action on the orders for an immediate action
against Georgia that he received the following May. He would not
consider another move into the South until December. 90
V\Tashington clung tenaciously to his instincts concerning
the importance of removing a British base in East Florida and
rightfully so, as he had suspected that a strike into Georgia would
come from St. Augustine even before the first British attempt in
1776.91 Having now authorized three failed attempts to capture St.
Augustine, Washington began planning for the southern army's
next offensive, set for the fall of 1778. At this point Washington's
instincts were proven correct. General Benjamin Lincoln gained
command of the Southern Department of the Continental Army
in September 1778, and soon thereafter received intelligence

88
89
90
91

Cashin, The King's R.anger, 78; see also Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest, 142145, for a full account of the Battle of Alligator Creek Bridge .
Alan Gallay, The Formation of the Planter Elite: Jonathan Bryan and the Southern
Colonial Frontier (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 156.
Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 410.
As Gary D. Olsen writes, "It was obvious that both loyalists and British
authorities would seek to use East Florida as a base from which to launch
military expeditions aimed at the re-establishment of royal government in the
Southern colonies ." Gary D. Olson, "Thomas Brown," in, Eighteenth-Century
Florida and the Revolutionary South, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University
Presses of Florida, 1978), 15.
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concerning another British strike into Georgia. 92 On the British
side, once the rebel invasion was repulsed in the summer of 1778,
the commanders were determined to put East Florida's troops on
the offensive. By pacifying Georgia, Clinton hoped to secure a
corridor of Loyalism along the Atlantic coast from St. Augustine
to Savannah before advancing on Charleston, then on to North
Carolina and Virginia. 9 3 At the same time, the Continental Congress
gave Lincoln the authority to launch another campaign against St.
Augustine before the end 1778. 94 It was a matter of which army
would strike first, but French generaljean B. Donatien de Vimeur,
Comte de Rochambeau convinced Washington that there was little
time to plan a fourth invasion of East Florida and the troops would
be needed to defend Savannah. 95 With the fourth incursion into
East Florida cancelled, the British were clear to invade Georgia.
On November 27, 1778, Clinton unleashed Lieutenant
Colonel Archibald Campbell, along with the 71 st Regiment, two
regiments of Hessians, four Loyalist Battalions, and a small artillery
company, approximately 3,500 troops aboard a fleet of thirty-seven
ships, to lay siege to Savannah. 96 As Campbell's invasion fleet sailed
southward from New York, General Prevost was to march into
southern Georgia with an armyof2,500 British regulars, East Florida
Rangers, and approximately 160 Creek warriors. 97 The initial plan
called for General Prevost to approach Savannah from the south as
Campbell anchored off Tybee Island at the mouth of the Savannah
River and moved inland. 98 But General Prevost received his orders
92

93
94
95

96

97

98

John C. Cavanaugh, "American Military Leadership in the Southern
Campaign: Benjamin Lincoln," in The Revolutionary War in the South: Power,
Conflict, and Leadership; Essays in Honor of john Richard Alden, ed. Robert W.
Higgins (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 102.
Ibid., 102.
Ibid., 102-03.
GWP, "George Washington to Robert Howe, Head Quts., Camp at Morris
Town, July 4, 1777," http:/ /memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3b/003/332331.
gif (accessed February 2006); GWP, "George Washington to John Rutledge,
Head Quarters, Morris Town, July 5, 1777," http:/ /memory.loc.gov/mss/
mgw/mgw3c/002/111110.gif (accessed February 2006).
Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 435; see also Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln,"
105; see also "A Letter from Col. Huger, Savannah, December 28, 1778," in
Moultrie, Memoirs, 1 :252.
General Prevost's army increased in size as it marched through Georgia as
many Loyalists took the opportunity to join in the victory. One British deserter
reported to rebel General William Moultrie that "about 200 Georgians have
already joined the enemy, most of them horsemen." "A Letter to Col. Charles
Pinckney, Purisburgh,January 16, 1779," in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:264.
The following information on the initial strike into Georgia and the capture of
Savannah may be found in Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 221.
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a month late and was just entering Georgia when Campbell arrived
at Tybee Island. As General Prevost fought his way past the rebel fort
at Sunbury and continued toward Savannah, Campbell happened
upon a most fortunate incident.
A slave woman approached a British reconnaissance patrol
and showed them a little known walking path into the city. This
allowed Campbell to bring his troops into Savannah and capture
Robert Howe's rebel army with barely a shot being fired. On
January 15, 1779, General Prevost took command of the combined
armies in Savannah and directed the remainder of the conquest of
Georgia. Campbell then turned westward with approximately 1,000
troops, and secured Augusta with little resistance. 99 On February
13, 1779, however, Campbell abandoned Augusta in full retreat for
Savannah as General Lincoln moved down from Charleston toward
Augusta with 3,600 Continental regulars, with an additional 1,500
men riding ahead of the main army. General Prevost developed a
strategy that would save Campbell's outnumbered army and stop
Lincoln in his tracks. He took 2,500 British regulars and Brown's
Rangers north from Savannah while Campbell, with the aid of
the younger Prevost, fought their way back to Savannah. 100 Once
Lincoln heard of the elder Prevost's maneuver, he reversed his army
back to protect Charleston, three days behind General Prevost.
Moultrie positioned a small rebel army between Charleston
and the advancing British but quickly surmised it best to safeguard
the city from behind its defenses rather than on open ground.
Though General Prevost had not brought proper siege cannons
or other provisions for such an endeavor, he played-out a decoy
maneuver by taking up offensive positions around Charleston,
giving Campbell more time to reach the safety of Savannah before
Lincoln could intercept his troops. After nearly three days, General
Prevost then retreated to Savannah, utilizing the coastal sea islands
of South Carolina and Georgia. Lincoln eventually caught up to
99

"Extract of a Letter to Col. C.C. Pinckney, President of the Senate, and Member
of the Council of Safety, Purisburgh,January 10t1 1779," in Moultrie, Memoirs,
1:261.
100 The preceding information on Campbell's retreat and General Prevost's
ensuing advance on Charleston is found in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:321-54.
Campbell was caught at Briar Creek by the advanced army of rebel dragoons
and won a stunning victory that allowed Campbell to complete his retreat to
Savannah. Moultrie considered the British victory at Briar Creek devastating
to rebel hopes of successfully staving- off the permanent loss of Georgia. For
information on Brown's Rangers escorting General Prevost on his decoy
maneuver on Charleston, see Cashin, The King's R.anger, 97.
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him, however, forcing the British to fight their way most of the
journey down the coast. 101 By late June 1779, British troops at
Savannah, which included regiments from St. Augustine and
Brown's Rangers, prepared the city's defenses for a siege .102
Though the senior Prevost, now a major general, entered
Georgia with no immediate intention to advance on Charleston,
he nearly accomplished with 2,5-00 regulars in 1778 what Clinton
could not with 2,500 men and fifty ships of war in 1776. 103 Forcing
the rebels to split their defenses among Charleston, Savannah, and
Augusta was the key to a successful invasion of Georgia; it was also
a critical strategy for taking South Carolina. By late July and early
August 1779, however, it was clear to all concerned that victory in
South Carolina depended upon the pacification of Georgia, and
vice versa. Georgia could only remain pacified if rebel influences
from South Carolina were not allowed to slip back into Georgia to
regroup. 104 The mechanics of a southern conquest conceived by
Germain hinged upon the stabilization of Georgia for the purpose
of subduing Charleston. Conversely, subduing Charleston, and
ultimately South Carolina, meant securing Georgia from further
rebel outbreaks. It was either a tandem approach or certain failure.
Had East Florida fallen to any of the rebel incursions, Germain's
entire strategy would have lost its foundation. Additionally, General
Prevost and his combined East Flo-rida-New York army proved to
be pivotal in the recapture and securing of Georgia. Ironically,
Clinton's hesitancy in responding to Germain's orders to attack
Georgia earlier in 1 778 might have unwittingly secured the success
of Britain's invasion of that colony in December. If Clinton had
responded immediately, General Prevost would have struck out for
Georgia in the early summer months and marched his army headlong into the muskets of Robert Howe's Continental troops as they
prepared to invade East Florida.
The final step in the stabilization of Georgia was the most
crucial: holding Savannah. There are many accounts of the
failed Franco/ American siege of Savannah in the fall of 1779, as
General Prevost's East Florida-New York-based troops repulsed the
101 The accounts of this action may be read in full in Lee, Memoirs of the War, 118127; see also Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 107-114.
102 Brown's troops, now renamed the King's Rangers, and their location may be
found listed on a contemporary sketch showing the defenses of Savannah
during this siege. Cashin, The King's Ranger, 86- 87.
103 Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 110.
104 Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 225.
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combined armies of General Lincoln, French Admiral d'Estaing,
and Poland's Count Casimir Pulaski and his cavalry. The ferocity of
General Prevost's resistance has been noted as rarely being equaled
during the war and is often compared to the Continental Army's
valiant, though unsuccessful, stand at Bunker Hill. 105 General
Prevost, however, had spent the past three years defending East
Florida against rebel invasions, experiences that prepared his army
well for this important role in the American Revolution.
Once news of General Prevost's success in holding Savannah
reached New York, Clinton was able to focus on Charleston. 106
This was typical of Clinton's maneuvering for his own benefit: let
General Prevost and Campbell risk their reputations by invading
and holding Savannah. Once Georgia was secure, Clinton could
approach Charleston as a conqueror, sterilizing the blemish on his
military record from the humiliating failed attempt in 1776. Thus,
Clinton's attack on Charleston was dependent upon securing
Savannah.
Like Clinton, Lord Germain understood that to sail directly
into Charleston with no support from any direction was, as Clinton
learned in 1776, to stray into a hornets' nest. 107 The best way to avoid
a repeat of Clinton's earlier debacle was to link the port cities of the
southern Atlantic coast, providing a corridor of British sovereignty
from St. Augustine to Savannah. With a Loyalist safe-zone at his
back, Clinton could focus his full attentions upon Charleston. 108
Germain would wait until news of a successful defense of Savannah
arrived in London, and only then would he continue with his plans
to besiege Charleston. 109
There is, of course, a great deal of well-known Revolutionary
War history in the southern colonies after 1 780: the fall of
Charleston, Cornwallis's Carolina campaigns, and the conclusive
victory at Yorktown. Washington would call for another invasion
of East Florida in 1780, but once again Rochambeau discouraged
such a move and convinced Washington to focus all of their efforts
on Cornwallis. 110 By the end of 1 781, the war on the North America
105
106
107
108
109
110
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Ibid., 120.
Pancake, This Destructive War, 57.
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GWP, "George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, Head Quarters, Morris Town,
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de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, and Charles Louis d'Arsac, Chevalier de
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mainland was basically over and the Southern Invasions from their
inception in 1775 through the last attempt in 1780, had been
dismal failures. The entirety of the war in the southern colonies
from 1 775-1 779 needs to be placed into the larger Revolutionary
War discussion. East Florida was significant to the British war
effort as a spearhead for both the Southern Expedition in 1776
and the Southern Invasion of 1780, which helps to explain why
St. Augustine was targeted for invasion by George Washington five
times, the last two of which were canceled because the first three
had been dismal failures.
Southerners did not sit idle for the first five years of the war.
Multiple fleets carrying thousands of British regulars were ordered
into the southern colonies by George III as early as October 16,
1775. When examined from an Atlantic world perspective, the
evidence demonstrates that Great Britain's first campaigns to quash
the American rebellion were not launched from Canada in 1777,
but from St. Augustine, Pensacola, New York, and Corke, Ireland
as early as 1775.
William Howe and his brother, Admiral Lord Richard Howe,
are typically credited for directing the first major British offensive
of the American Revolution against Washington on Long Island in
the summer and fall of 1 776. The combined battles of Saratoga,
from September 19-0ctober 17, 1777, have been highlighted in
American history as the sole turning point of the war. These positions
need to be revised and the role of the southern colonies from
1775-1779 revisited. When the Revolution is viewed in its entirety,
from both a British and American perspective, the cumulative
results of all campaigns, in all theaters of war, provide a greater
clarity to what actually occurred and why. Neither of the southern
campaigns were responsible for the increasing disillusionment in
London in and of themselves, but when contextualized within the
larger picture of an Atlantic world conflict, they were contributory
factors whose importance has been underplayed .
For the British, a study of the early southern campaigns shows
a significant increase in the negative impact of costly defeats, both
in men and materiel, over what has been viewed previously. It also
exposes the pragmatic alienation of Indian allies and many loyal
British subjects in the southern backcountry. By late 1777, when
the general public in London had become fatigued with bad news
Ternay, New Windsor, December 15, 1780," http:/ / memory.loc.gov/ mss/
mgw/ mgw3d/ 001 / 184183.gif (accessed February 2006).
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frorri the battlefronts, they had suffered through the embarrassing
loss of two major campaigns-Clinton's Southern Expedition in
1775-1776 and Burgoyne's northern campaign in 1777-not just
one.
For the American cause of independence, a tenacity in the
leadership of Washington is evident as he never took his eye off of
the prize of a unified southern region. For the British, the stability
of the southern colonies was a principle concern from the outset of
the rebellion. This study opens a larger discussion concerning the
South and the strategic plans of both the victorious rebels and the
British that includes East Florida, which typically has been seen as
irrelevant to Revolutionary War events.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol93/iss3/7

28

